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Development of Joint Action: Planning

Objection: ‘Despite the common impression that joint action needs to be dumbed down for infants due to their ‘‘lack of a robust theory of mind’’ ... all the important social-cognitive building blocks for joint action appear to be in place: 1-year-old infants understand quite a bit about others’ goals and intentions and what knowledge they share with others’

\citep[p.~383]{carpenter:2009_howjoint}.
Carpenter conflates goals and intentions, so ignores the key difference between actions and plans.

‘I ... adopt Bratman’s (1992) influential formulation of joint action or shared cooperative activity. Bratman argued that in order for an activity to be considered shared or joint each partner needs to intend to perform the joint action together ‘‘in accordance with and because of meshing subplans’’ (p. 338) and this needs to be common knowledge between the participants’

\citep[p.~381]{carpenter:2009_howjoint}.

Carpenter, 2009

So: the objection I just offered to taking Bratman’s account of shared intention and joint action to characterise the notion of joint action of interest in explaining development was narrowly theoretical.
The objection was that you can’t explain the developmental emergence of mindreading by invoking joint action if your account of joint action implies that abilities to perform joint actions presuppose sophisticated mindreading.
Accepting this theoretical objection would be consistent with accepting Carpenter’s claim. The only consequence is that we would have to reject the conjecture that you can explain the developmental emergence of mindreading by invoking joint action.
challenge
Explain the emergence of sophisticated human activities including referential communication and mindreading.
conjecture
Joint action plays a role in explaining how sophisticated human activities emerge.
objection
Joint action presupposes mindreading at the limits of human abilities.
So I think Carpenter is saying: the objection is correct, and we should reject the conjecture.

‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning’

Bratman, 2011 p. 11

‘shared intentional agency [i.e. ‘joint action’] consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning agency of the participants’ \citep{Bratman:2011fk}.

Paulus et al, 2016 figure 1

Task: give the tool to another person, who needs to put the spherical end into the box. (Tip: you need to grasp it by the spherical end and pass it so that the other takes the cube-end; they can then insert it optimally.)

Paulus et al, 2016 figure 2B

‘3- and 5-year-old children do not consider another person’s actions in their own action planning (while showing action planning when acting alone on the apparatus).

Seven-year-old children and adults however, demonstrated evidence for joint action planning. ... While adult participants demonstrated the presence of joint action planning from the very first trials onward, this was not the case for the 7-year-old children who improved their performance across trials.’

\citep[p.~1059]{paulus:2016_development}

Paulus et al, 2016 p. 1059

Warneken et al, 2014 figure 1A

‘One child had to insert the turn-tool on the right of the apparatus and then turn so that the metal rod stretching across moved the panel out of the way of the ball. The other person could then insert the push tool on the left, pushing the silver ball into the hole similar to a billiard cue.’ \citep{warneken:2014_young}

Warneken et al, 2014 figure 2

Unidirectional : child A has to select the tool that B doesn’t have.
Bidirectional : child A can select either tool.
‘(a) Unidirectional: The left box will be opened first. Only the left child has a choice. For success, this child has to choose the push tool (lower left: thick handle, long thin top). The partner child has to retrieve the only available turn tool (upper right: thick handle, short thin top).’ \citep{warneken:2014_young}

Warneken et al, 2014 figure 3

BU - first bidirectional then unidirectional.
The three year olds are hopeless in all conditions except the bidirectional condition when they have first had the unimanual condition. So there is no forward planning, but there is some evidence that three-year-olds can take into account what another has done.
‘by age 3 children are able to learn, under certain circumstances, to take account of what a partner is doing in a collaborative problem-solving context. By age 5 they are already quite skillful at attending to and even anticipating a partner’s actions’ \citep[p.~57]{warneken:2014_young}.

What is shared intention?

Functional characterisation:

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining

Constraint:

Inferential integration... and normative integration (e.g. agglomeration)

Substantial account:

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

Note that the conditions require not just that we intend the joint action, but that we intend it because of each other's intentions, where this is common knowledge.
What we have seen suggests that even three-year-olds are probably incapable of meeting this condition ...
... and the idea that they need to know things about another’s intentions about their intentions seems like a bold conjecture indeed.

Mismatch:

Bratman’s account of joint action

vs

1- to 3-year-olds’ joint action abilities

All the evidence has suggests that there is a mismatch between Bratman’s account of joint action and 1- to 3-year-olds’ joint action abilities.
Let’s consider two more studies on this ...

Meyer et al, 2016 figure 1A

Child pass cups to adult who has one had occupied. Adult and child separated by glass window, so have to reach around.
‘Example of a 3-year-old child engaged in the joint-action task with an adult experimenter. (Top) The start of a trial in which the child has a cup and sees the experimenter holding the cup tower in her left hand. The lower two images illustrate the different possible response choices of the child. The child chooses in one trial to pass the cup on the side that is accommodating the other’s actions (middle); and in another trial, on the side that is not accommodating the execution of the partner’s actions (bottom).’ \citep{meyer:2016_planning}
‘To build one tower, children had to pass five cups. Then the experimenter introduced the next hand puppet with the same procedure. With each change of hand puppet, she switched sides by putting the puppet on her previously free hand ... in total four towers were built, two on each side.’ \citep{meyer:2016_planning}

Meyer et al, 2016 figure 1B

Meyer et al, 2016 figure 1C

Meyer et al, 2016 figure 2

‘two measures of interest: the initial response choice (i.e. the first trial only) and the continuous response choice (i.e. all trials except the first)’ \citep{meyer:2016_planning}
‘In their initial response choice, children had to plan ahead without having experienced how their own action would affect their joint- action partner. Thus, the initial response choice reflects whether children proactively planned to accommodate their joint-action partner.’ \citep{meyer:2016_planning}

Meyer et al, 2016 figure 3

3-year-olds and younger: not good at changing the side they pass the object on to take into account where the other will reach it.
‘children proactively plan their actions in a way that accommodates the actions of their partner early in childhood. By contrast, the flexible adjustment of their action plans to their partner only begins to develop in the fourth and fifth year of life. Notably, even at the age of 5 children only adjusted their action plans to a surprisingly small degree’ \citep[p.~8]{meyer:2016_planning}.
I think: the good results on the initial response choice at all ages suggest that some ability to take into account another’s immediate future actions may already be present at 2-and-a-half years of age (although this is not strong evidence).
Note that the success concerns anticipating ACTIONS not antcipating PLANS.

Mismatch:

Bratman’s account of joint action

vs

1- to 3-year-olds’ joint action abilities

All the evidence has suggests that there is a mismatch between Bratman’s account of joint action and 1- to 3-year-olds’ joint action abilities.
Let’s consider one more study on this ...

Gerson et al, 2016 figure 1B

Subjects: three-year-olds.
Four balls, four egg cups. Yellow balls must go in yellow egg cups, brown balls likewise. One ball is brown and yellow and can go in either colour egg cup. But you only have four egg cups, so you have to put it in whatever egg cup will enable you to place the other three balls correctly.
Experiment: compare performance in an individual condition (child does all) with performance in a joint condition (child alternates with puppet) and a control condition with a machine (not joint action, but similar turn-taking required.)
‘The joint play session consisted of nine trials. In the first, fourth, and seventh trial, Kip let the child place the first (and third) ball and Kip placed the second (multi-colored) and fourth ball. Kip always placed the multi-colored ball in the cup that allowed all forthcoming balls to be placed correctly. In the other six trials, Kip placed the first and third balls and the child placed the second and fourth balls. This ensured that the number of trials for which the child had to plan (by placing the multi-colored ball correctly) was matched across the individual and joint conditions.’ \citep{gerson:2016_social}

Gerson et al, 2016 figure 3

Results: When acting alone or alternating with a machine, three-year-olds were above chance at selecting the correct egg cup for the two-coloured ball. But in joint action they were not above chance, and their performance was significantly worse than when acting alone.
The results indicate that
‘proactive planning for two individuals, even when they share a common goal, is more difficult than planning ahead solely for oneself’ \citep[p.~128]{gerson:2016_social}.

How does Gerson et al’s study bear on the claim that Bratman’s account of shared intention and joint action characterises the social interactions children perform in the first two years of life?

What is shared intention?

Functional characterisation:

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities, (b) coordinate planning and (c) structure bargaining

Constraint:

Inferential integration... and normative integration (e.g. agglomeration)

Substantial account:

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

As I said, All the evidence has suggests that there is a mismatch between Bratman’s account of joint action and 1- to 3-year-olds’ joint action abilities.
I started with Carpenter’s objection ...

Objection: ‘Despite the common impression that joint action needs to be dumbed down for infants due to their ‘‘lack of a robust theory of mind’’ ... all the important social-cognitive building blocks for joint action appear to be in place: 1-year-old infants understand quite a bit about others’ goals and intentions and what knowledge they share with others’

Carpenter conflates goals and intentions, so ignores the key difference between actions and plans.

‘I ... adopt Bratman’s (1992) influential formulation of joint action or shared cooperative activity. Bratman argued that in order for an activity to be considered shared or joint each partner needs to intend to perform the joint action together ‘‘in accordance with and because of meshing subplans’’ (p. 338) and this needs to be common knowledge between the participants’

Carpenter, 2009

It turns out, I think, that Carpenter is wrong to this extent. Whatever exactly one-year-olds mindreading abilities, they do not seem to be making much use of information about others’ intentions in performing joint actions. And so it is wrong to think of their abilities in terms of Bratman’s account of joint actions.
challenge
Explain the emergence of sophisticated human activities including referential communication and mindreading.
conjecture
Joint action plays a role in explaining how sophisticated human activities emerge.
objection
Joint action presupposes mindreading at the limits of human abilities.
So with respect to our overall line of enquiry, it may still be possible to hold on to the conjecture if we can overcome the objection.