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‘participants in joint action are usually focused on whatever it is they are jointly doing rather than on each other. Where joint action goes smoothly, the participants are not thinking about the others anymore than they are thinking about themselves’
\citep[p.~37]{Schmid:2013}
 
‘cooperators normatively expect their partners to cooperate; they do not predict their cooperation’
 
Dominant View: ‘the representation of the participation of the others has a mind-to-world direction of fit.’
 
Alternative View: ‘the representation of the participation of the others has a world-to-mind direction of fit.’
\citep[p.~38]{Schmid:2013}
 
‘participants in a joint action represent their partners as doing their parts in the same way as individual intentions implicitly represent the agent as continuing to be willing and able to perform the action until the intention’s conditions of satisfaction are reached’
‘individual agents of temporally extended actions “represent” their own future intentions and actions in the same way in which cooperators represent their partners’ intentions and actions.’
\citep[p.~49]{Schmid:2013}
 
‘this representation is neither (purely) cognitive nor (purely) normative, but rather a very peculiar combination of the two. ’
\citep[p.~50]{Schmid:2013}
 
‘An individual with a purely cognitive stance toward his own future self’s behavior and no normative expectation is a predictor of his behavior rather than an intender of his future action;
\citep[p.~50]{Schmid:2013}
 

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