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The Simple View
Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are appropriately related to their actions.
1. Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments.
2. Having the intentions specified by the Simple View would not entail having contralateral commitments.
(Because ‘it is unclear how one’s own intention to pursue a goal amounts to a commitment to anyone besides oneself.’ (Roth, 2004 p. 371))
3. An account of shared agency must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.
Therefore
4. The Simple View is at best incomplete.
Objection
1. The states specified by Bratman’s view are not associated with contralateral commitments.
2. An account of shared agency must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.
Therefore
3. Bratman’s view is at best incomplete.
We have a shared intention that we J if
‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J
‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …
‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’
(Bratman 1993: View 4)
‘When people regard themselves as collectively intending to do something, they appear to understand that, by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone, each party has the standing to demand [...] conformity of the other parties. A joint commitment account of collective intention respects this fact. [...] accounts that do not appeal to joint commitment—such as those of Michael Bratman and John Searle—are hard-pressed to do so.’
Gilbert (2013, pp 88-9)
Bratman: ‘Shared intention, social explanation’
If I assure you of something, or intentionally encourage you to rely on it, then you are in a special position to criticise me.
The association of shared intention with contralateral commitments is a consequence of the fact that shared intentions are often sustained by assurance and suchlike.
Contralateral commitments sometimes enable us to have shared intentions.
How is contralateral commitment associated with shared intention?
Bratman: it’s extrinsic
Gilbert (and others): it’s intrinsic
Not all shared intention involves contralateral commitment.
All shared intention involves contralateral commitment.
The existence of contralateral commitments can be explained by general ethical and social facts.
The existence of contralateral commitments cannot be explained by general ethical and social facts.
‘informal observation including self-observation’ and my ‘own sense of the matter’.
(Gilbert, 2014 pp. 24, 358)
Objection
1. The states specified by Bratman’s view are not associated with contralateral commitments.
2. An account of shared agency must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.
Therefore
3. Bratman’s view is at best incomplete.
The objection from contralateral commitments fails (as it stands).
But there is an independent objection to Bratman’s view.
A stipulation about contralateral commitments might overcome this objection.
Or maybe we just need joint commitments to fully understand shared agency.
Joint Action
Parallel but Merely Individual Action
Two people making the cross hit the red square in the ordinary way.
Beatrice & Baldric’s making the cross hit the red square
Two sisters cycling together.
Two strangers cycling the same route side-by-side.
Members of a flash mob simultaneously open their newspapers noisily.
Onlookers simultaneously open their newspapers noisily.
Contralateral commitments are associated with shared intention, not joint action.
Shared intention does not require much commitment.
‘If they are walking together, both Andrea herself and Heinrich will have the understandings so far described: by virtue of their walking together Andrea has a right to Heinrich’s continued walking alongside her, together with the standing to issue related rebukes and demands.’
Gilbert (2014, p. 25)
‘Mightn’t one have a noncommittal attitude toward one’s walk with someone if, for example, one suspects that person might turn out to be irritable and unpleasant company?’
Roth (2004, p. 361)