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‘participation in … leads children to construct uniquely powerful forms of cognitive representation.’
\citep{Moll:2007gu}
 
‘perception, action, and cognition are grounded in
\citep[p.\ 103]{Knoblich:2006bn}
 
‘human cognitive abilities … [are] built upon
\citep{sinigaglia:2008_roots}
 
‘I will … adopt Bratman’s … influential formulation of joint action … each partner needs to intend to perform the joint action together ‘‘in accordance with and because of meshing subplans’’ (p. 338) and this needs to be common knowledge between the participants.’
\citep[][p.\ 281]{carpenter:2009_howjoint}
 
Objection: Meeting the sufficient conditions for joint action given by Bratman’s account could not significantly \textit{explain} the development of an understanding of minds because it already \textit{presupposes} too much sophistication in the use of psychological concepts.
 
The objection arises because not all of the following claims are true: % \begin{quote} (1) joint action fosters an understanding of minds; (2) all joint action involves shared intention; and (3) a function of shared intention is to coordinate two or more agents’ plans. \end{quote} % These claims are inconsistent because if the second and third were both true, abilities to engage in joint action would presuppose, and so could not significantly foster, an understanding of minds.
 
What are our options?
 
This is a bad option; it either involves rejecting claims about intention that amount to saying there is no such thing as intention, or else it involves breaking the parallel between intention and shared intention. But that parallel is pretty much all we have to anchor or understanding of shared intention.
 

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