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\title {Joint Action \\ Lecture 13}

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Lecture 13

Joint Action

[email protected]

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Question

What distinguishes genuine joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?

Diagnosis

Too reflective!

Grounded merely on intuitive contrasts!

I think our problems have at least two sources.

In the last lecture, I suggested that we can deal with the problem that they are too reflective by invoking the notion of parallel planning, which allows us to revised the Simple View.

In this lecture I want to consider the other source of our problems: the fact that our approach is grounded on merely intuitive constrats ...

Thing to Be Explained

Candidate Explanation

Dimming of a star.

Conjecture about a planet.

Object-tracking abilities in infants.

Conjecture about innate knowledge.

Abilities to act together.

Conjecture about shared intention.

Key issue: how to characterise the abilities to be explained by the theory?

Bratman’s book is state of the art. How does he introduce the thing to be explained? By giving examples ...

walking together

singing a duet together

painting a house together

having a conversation together

making dinner together

building a hut together

planting a garden together

Why is merely giving examples problematic? Isn’t this a perfectly good way to identify the thing to be explained?

One problem is that the examples do not give us a sense of how to go on. There are three key cases in which people here are likely to disagree. Are these further cases genuine joint actions?

? Walking together in the Tarantino sense ? [non-coercion]

In walking together in the Tarantino sense, the guns sustain your intention that we, you and I, walk together. (So this is not a case in which the guns replace the intentions.) [Btw, I'm not sure it’s right that parallel planning would be irrational in this case. After all, the guns provide near-certainty about our intentions.]

? The strangers blocking the aisle ? [awareness]

? Beatrice & Baldric ? [cooperation]

And these cases are not merely irrelevant edge-cases. They are related to three key questions we might ask about joint action.

The first question is: Is coercion compatible with joint action?

Second, Does participating in joint action entail being aware that you are doing so?

Third, Are all joint actions cooperative actions? According to Searle, they are. (‘The notion of a [shared intention] ... implies the notion of cooperation’ \citep[p.~95]{Searle:1990em}; and of course he thinks that all joint actions involve shared (we-) intentions.)

Let me mention one further example which arises from the conflict between Gilbert and Bratman.

Fourth, Do participants in joint actions necessarily have contralateral commitments to each other to participate in this joint action?

	Bratman	Simple View Revised
Is coercion compatible with joint action?	yes	yes
Does participating in joint action entail being aware that you are doing so?	yes	[ish]
Are all joint actions cooperative actions?	no	yes
Are contralateral commitments necessary for joint action?	no	no

So here are four questions about joint action that it seems we cannot answer if what anchors discussion is merely examples and intuitions.

(Of course someone might reply that careful use of intuitions would be enable us to answer some or all of these questions. There is a hint that this is Bratman’s own view in remarks on tricky cases involving coercion such as, ‘Though what we are doing seems ill-described as a cooperative activity, it may be plausible to describe it as a shared intentional activity’ \citep[p.~38]{bratman:2014_book}.)

Why does this matter? Suppose we are trying to construct a theory of joint action.

[1] Any such theory will, if it is adequate, provide answers to these questions. For example, Bratman’s theory implies that non-coercion, cooperation and commitment are not required for joint action [or what he calls ‘shared intentional activity’] whereas awareness is.

[2] How can we tell whether these answers are correct? We might try appealing to features of the theory itself, such as its internal coherence or the absence of a competing theory.

But there are competing, internally coherent, theories which provide different answers.

For example, as we will see, the Simple View Revised implies that cooperation but not non-coercion is required for joint action, and it imposes a complex condition on awareness.

[2b] Alternatively we might try appealing to metatheoretical considerations like Bratman’s ‘Continuity Thesis’. Again, the obstacle to doing this is that we can construct accounts which have similar metatheoretical properties but give different answer to the four questions.

[We will consider this point more deeply when we return to Bratman vs Gilbert.]

[3] So it seems that to determine whether a theory is correct we need to know whether it correctly answers the four questions about non-coercion, awareness, cooperation and commitment. And to know this, it seems that we cannot rely on internal features of the theory, nor on metatheoretical considerations

[4] Apparently, then, our pre-theoretical fix on the things to be explained should enable us to be able to answer these questions.

Unless we can answer these three questions, it seems to me that we do not have a sufficient grip on joint action--that is, on the thing to be explained.

tldr;

Examples and contrast cases
are just not enough
to ground a theory of joint action.

Some people will be yawning. Surely they aren’t enough to ground a theory of anything! This is just the wrong way to do philosophy!

But look around at what’s published. Have you seen anyone who acknowledges this and explicitly provides an alternative basis for the theory?

So let me take a moment to ask you, Do you agree?

Searle vs Bratman on Cooperation

\section{Searle vs Bratman on Cooperation}

According to Searle, ‘The notion of a we-intention [shared intention] ... implies the notion of cooperation’ (1990, p. 95). Could this be the basis for an objection to Bratman’s theory of shared agency?

‘One can have a goal in the knowledge that others also have the same goal,
and one can have beliefs and even mutual beliefs about the goal that is shared by the members of a group,
without there being necessarily any cooperation among the members or any intention to cooperate’

\citep[p.~95]{Searle:1990em}

Searle, 1990 p. 95

What is shared intention?

Functional characterisation:

shared intention serves to (a) coordinate activities,
(b) coordinate planning, and
(c) structure bargaining

Substantial account:

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

1. ‘The notion of a we-intention [shared intention]
... implies the notion of cooperation’

\citep[p.~95]{Searle:1990em}

Searle (1990, p. 95)

[explain ‘we-intention’]

Why is this relevant. Because ...

2. Meeting Bratman’s proposed sufficient conditions for shared intention does not imply that youractions will be cooperative.

Bratman says this explicitly.

Therefore:

3. Bratman’s conditions are not in fact sufficient.

There are just two problems with this argument

First problem: how do we know this is true?

Second problem: what is it for our actions to be cooperative? (Bratman asserts the second premise, but does not provide justification ‘This involves a bit of linguistic legislation’.)

‘This involves a bit of linguistic legislation’

\citep[p.~38]{bratman:2014_book}

Bratman, 2015 p. 38

So Bratman thinks that the issue about cooperation is merely one on which we can do ‘linguistic legislation’.

Perhaps closer attention to the notion of cooperation would be rewarding ...

	Bratman	Simple View Revised
Is coercion compatible with joint action?	yes	yes
Does participating in joint action entail being aware that you are doing so?	yes	[ish]
Are all joint actions cooperative actions?	no	yes
Are contralateral commitments necessary for joint action?	no	no

Examples and contrast cases
are just not enough
to ground a theory of joint action.

How can we go about constructing
a theory of phenomena
associated with acting together?

How to go about constructing a theory of phenomena associated with acting together?

Step 1: identify features associated with things commonly taken to be paradigm joint actions in non mechanistic terms, e.g.

- collective goals

- coordination

- cooperation

- contralateral commitments

- ...

Step 2: generate how questions.

Step 3: answer the how questions.

Step 4: determine implications for philosophical approaches to joint action.

No psychological states, ...

For example, one how question is, How could our actions, yours and mine, have a collective goal?

E.g., wrt collective goals the question is, In virtue of what could two or more agents’ actions have a collective goal. Importantly, the collective goal does not involve any psychological mechanism.

The aim of the theory is then to answer the how questions

Now let’s take a look at how this might go for collective goals.

Collective Goals

\section{Collective Goals}

An outcome is a collective goal of two or more actions involving multiple agents just if the actions are directed to this goal and this is not, or not just, a matter of each action being individually directed to that goal.

goal != intention

As this illustrates, some actions involving are purposive in the sense that

among all their actual and possible consequences,

there are outcomes to which they are directed

and the actions are collectively directed to this outcome

so it is not just a matter of each individual action being directed to this outcome.

In such cases we can say that the actions are clearly purposive.

Concerning any such actions, we can ask What is the relation between a purposive action and the outcome or outcomes to which it is directed?

The standard answer to this question involves intention.

An intention (1) specifies an outcome,

(2) coordinates the one or several activities which comprise the action;

and (3) coordinate these activities in a way that would normally facilitate the outcome’s occurrence.

What binds particular component actions together into larger purposive actions? It is the fact that these actions are all parts of plans involving a single intention. What singles out an actual or possible outcome as one to which the component actions are collectively directed? It is the fact that this outcome is represented by the intention.

So the intention is what binds component actions together into purposive actions and links the action taken as a whole to the outcomes to which they are directed.

But is intention the only thing that can link actions to outcomes? I will suggest that motor representations can likewise perform this role.

goal != intention

Let me first explain something about this notion of a collective goal ...

Ayesha takes a glass and holds it up while Beatrice pours prosecco; unfortunately the prosecco misses the glass and soak Zachs’s trousers.

Here are two sentences, both true:

The tiny drops fell from the bottle.

The tiny drops soaked Zach’s trousers.

The first sentence is naturally read *distributively*; that is, as specifying something that each drop did individually. Perhaps first drop one fell, then another fell.

But the second sentence is naturally read *collectively*. No one drop soaked Zach’s trousers; rather the soaking was something that the drops accomplised together.

If the sentence is true on this reading, the tiny drops' soaking Zach’s trousers is not a matter of each drop soaking Zach’s trousers.

Now consider an example involving actions and their outcomes:

Their thoughtless actions soaked Zach’s trousers. [causal]

- ambiguous

This sentence can be read in two ways, distributively or collectively. We can imagine that we are talking about a sequence of actions done over a period of time, each of which soaked Zach’s trousers. In this case the outcome, soaking Zach’s trousers, is an outcome of each action.

Alternatively we can imagine several actions which have this outcome collectively---as in our illustration where Ayesha holds a glass while Beatrice pours. In this case the outcome, soaking Zach’s trousers, is not necessarily an outcome of any of the individual actions but it is an outcome of all of them taken together. That is, it is a collective outcome.

(Here I'm ignoring complications associated with the possibility that some of the actions collectively soaked Zach’s trousers while others did so distributively.)

Note that there is a genuine ambiguity here. To see this, ask yourself how many times Zach’s trousers were soaked. On the distributive reading they were soaked at least as many times as there are actions. On the collective reading they were not necessarily soaked more than once. (On the distributive reading there are several outcomes of the same type and each action has a different token outcome of this type; on the collective reading there is a single token outcome which is the outcome of two or more actions.)

Conclusion so far: two or more actions involving multiple agents can have outcomes distributively or collectively. This is not just a matter of words; there is a difference in the relation between the actions and the outcome.

Now consider one last sentence:

The goal of their actions was to fill Zach’s glass. [teleological]

Whereas the previous sentence was causal, and so concened an actual outcome of some actions, this sentence is teleological, and so concerns an outcome to which actions are directed.

- also ambiguous

Like the previous sentence, this sentence has both distributive and collective readings. On the distributive reading, each of their actions was directed to an outcome, namely soaking Zach’s trousers. So there were as many attempts on his trousers as there are actions. On the collective reading, by contrast, it is not necessary that any of the actions considered individually was directed to this outcome; rather the actions were collectively directed to this outcome.

Conclusion so far: two or more actions involving multiple agents can be collectively directed to an outcome.

Where two or more actions are collectively directed to an outcome, we will say that this outcome is a *collective goal* of the actions. Note two things. First, this definition involves no assumptions about the intentions or other mental states of the agents. Relatedly, it is the actions rather than the agents which have a collective goal. Second, a collective goal is just an actual or possible outcome of an action.

An outcome is a \emph{collective goal} of two or more actions involving multiple agents if it is an outcome to which those actions are collectively directed.

Can we simply define joint action in terms of collective goals? Not usefully ...

Joint action:

An event with two or more agents where the actions have a collective goal.

Is this good enough? I think it isn’t ...

For example, when two agents between them lift a heavy block by means of each agent pulling on either end of a rope connected to the block via a system of pulleys, their pullings count as coordinated just because the rope relates the force each exerts on the block to the force exerted by the other.

In this case, the agents' activities are coordinated by a mechanism in their environment, the rope, and not necessarily by any psychological mechanism.

To make a conjecture based on work with bees and ants, in some cases ...

the coordination needed for a collective goal may even be supplied by behavioural patterns \citep{seeley2010honeybee} and pheromonal signals \citep[pp.\ 178-83, 206-21]{hoelldobler2009superorganism}.

So the definition seems inadequate. Either it includes things that are not joint actions at all, or else it captures a notion of joint action that is broader than the core cases of shared agency that have been of primary interest to philosophers.

And, to return to the point about cooperation, the bare idea that our actions have a collective goal implies nothing about cooperation.

This is not to say that collective goals never involve psychological states.

In fact, one way for several actions to have a collective goal is for their agents to be acting on a shared intention;

a shared intention supplies the required coordination.

We’ve been considering the idea that we can extend our defintion of joint to include the notion of a collective goal ... On our current working definition, a joint action is an event with two or more agents where the actions have a collective goal.

[Too broad!]

The definition is still too broad. To make progress we need to think not just about collective goals but about the different kinds of thing in virtue of which some actions can have a collective goal ...

Better approach:

In virtue of what could two or more agents’ actions have a collective goal?

objection

Is there a collective interpretation
of ‘The goal of their actions was to fill Zach’s glass’?

Ludwig (personal communication) says not. A quick look at his account of plural prediction suggests that, as he says, there is no such interpretation. But could that be a defect of his account?

there is a single outcome, G, such that

(a) Our actions are coordinated; and

(b) coordination of this type would normally increase the probability that G occurs.

A collective goal (df):

an outcome to which two or more agents’ actions are directed

where

this is not, or not only,

a matter of each action being directed to that outcome.

We replace the old question about distinguishing joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions with a set of questions about features associated with joint action, including this one.

Separate projects:

Characterise the thing to be explained!

Identify the thing(s) which explain(s) it!

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

Examples and contrast cases
are just not enough
to ground a theory of joint action.
A better approach: identify features independently of characterising mechanisms.
Collective goals are a feature of some or all joint actions.

How to ground a theory of joint action?

Step 1: identify features ...

- collective goals

- coordination

- cooperation

- contralateral commitments

- experience

Step 2: ... which generate how questions.

Keyboard Shortcuts?

Lecture 13

Joint Action

[email protected]

Searle vs Bratman on Cooperation

Collective Goals

Keyboard Shortcuts`?`