Click here and press the right key for the next slide (or swipe left)

also ...

Press the left key to go backwards (or swipe right)

Press n to toggle whether notes are shown (or add '?notes' to the url before the #)

Press m or double tap to slide thumbnails (menu)

Press ? at any time to show the keyboard shortcuts

\title {Joint Action \\ Lecture 06}

\maketitle

Lecture 06

Joint Action

[email protected]

\def \ititle {Lecture 06}

\def \isubtitle {Joint Action}

\begin{center}

{\Large

\textbf{\ititle}: \isubtitle

}

\iemail %

\end{center}

joint commitment

(It will take us a while to get to joint commitment; first we’ll just think about commitment.)

\section{Commitment in Shared Agency}

Are there forms of commitment which are somehow associated with shared intention? Margaret Gilbert and Abe Roth (among several others) have argued that there are. What are the key features Gilbert identifies, and what arguments does Roth offer?

Intentions are associated with commitments to yourself.

Intending to visit the book shop involves a kind of commitment to do so. This kind of commitment is part of what distinguishes desire from intention ...

‘Having a desire to walk together is compatible with having a desire not to do so ... whereas, in intending, one has gone beyond the point of weighing considerations for and against, and has committed to a course of action.’

\citep[p.~361]{Roth:2004ki}

Roth (2004, p. 361)

To put this another way: not acting on a desire is not generally a failure, whereas not acting on an intention is generally a failure of some kind. (This is consistent with saying that there can be overwhelmingly strong reasons not to act on a particular intention, of course.)

What kind of commitments?

Ethical commitments? No.

What is the source of the commitments associated with intentions? Could their source be some general ethical principles? This seems unlikely for two reasons. First, you might intend to do something utterly abhorrent. While I think such intentions are associated with commitments, I don’t think that the fact you have an intention contributes anything at all to a an ethical evaluation of such actions. (It’s not just that the intention is a very small consideration; it simply has no place in ethical discussion at all.)

What about the second reason? ...

Intentions are associated with commitments *to yourself*. (In Gilbert’s terms, the commitment is a source of directed obligations; it is you and no one else who is obligated to ensure you act to fulfil your intention.) Others are not generally entitled to criticise you for failing to fulfil intentions; or, if they are, it is usually because they have some legitimate interest in you. By contrast, ethical principles are not naturally thought of as specific to you in this way.

Gilbert calls them

‘Personal commitments’

and I will suppose that they are distinctive of intentions.

How is this relevant to our interest in shared agency? ...

Shared intentions are associated with commitments to each other.

To borrow an example from Abe Roth and Margaret Gilbert (Roth 2004, p. 363), consider two people who have a shared intention that they walk. Suppose one person walks too fast for the other to keep up. The other person has a special ground for criticising the first.

‘Sue is in a special position to criticize Jack when he walks too fast.’

Roth (2004, p. 364)

This is one of Gilbert’s great insights about commitment. I want to emphasise it because it’s so important.

‘the parties to a joint commitment are in an important sense obligated to conform to the commitment. Notably, the obligation in question is directed : … one is obligated to the other parties to conform to the commitment.’

\citep[p.~367]{gilbert:2014_book}

Gilbert (2013, p. 367)

As I say, this is a great insight. It’s also a source of Gilbert’s eventual downfall, I think. But it will be useful to us.

What kind of commitments?

So shared intention is associated have a kind of commitment that is neither a personal commitment nor, apparently, one that has an ethical basis. But what is the nature of this commitment?

personal commitments?

A personal commitment is a commitment to oneself.

ethical commitments?

Because ethical commitments are not directed.

So we have to be cautious here; we know that there is something associated with shared intention that is neither a personal commitment nor an ethical commitment, but we don’t yet want to commit to a theory of the nature of that thing.

Note that neither of these options obviously implies the other. (A contralateral commitment is one that is, in part, directed to another individual; it is not necessarily a ‘commitment by two or more people’ nor a ‘commitment of two or more people’.)

Is having a contralateral commitment just a matter of having conditional commitments?

‘Bob is committed to walking, on the condition that Sue is (similarly) committed.’
‘Sue is committed to walking, on the condition that Bob is (similarly) committed.’

‘Whether your partner has the relevant commitment is up to you.’

‘It's not even clear from the start that Bob has any commitment ... because his commitment is, in effect, conditioned on itself (by way of the conditioning on Sue's intention).’

\citep[p.~378]{Roth:2004ki}

Roth (2004, p. 378)

The quote continues: ‘But if Bob's intention is conditioned on itself, then (as we saw above in the discussion of (iii)) it is not really an intention, and, in any case, it lacks the commitment we need in order to account for shared agency.’

conclusion so far:

Intentions
are associated with
commitments to oneself.

Shared intentions
are somehow associated with
contralateral commitments.

Anything unclear?

The Objection From Contralateral Commitment

\section{The Objection From Contralateral Commitment}

A premise linking shared intention with contralateral commitments provides the basis for an objection against Bratman’s account (among others’ accounts) of shared intention. What is the objection and should we accept it?

The Simple View

Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are appropriately related to their actions.

Recall the simple view ...

1. Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments.

This is generally taken to be an objection to the Simple View. But what exactly is the objection?

2. Having the intentions specified by the Simple View would not entail having contralateral commitments.

(Because ‘it is unclear how one’s own intention to pursue a goal amounts to a commitment to anyone besides oneself.’ (Roth, 2004 p. 371))

To see this, consider the mafia case and related cases.

3. An account of shared agency must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.

Therefore

4. The Simple View is at best incomplete.

Why aren’t we offering a stronger conclusion?

Because the first premise is so weak. If we strengthen premise 1 to say that having shared intentions entails having contralateral commitments, then we would have a stronger argument. Except that it would be harder to defend premise 1.

So far we haven’t really given an argument for this second premise. Eventually we will consider Bratman’s argument against this third premise. But first let’s consider how a variation on this argument can be used to object to Bratman’s account of shared intention ...

We have a shared intention that we J if

‘1. (a) I intend that we J and (b) you intend that we J

‘2. I intend that we J in accordance with and because of la, lb, and meshing subplans of la and lb; you intend [likewise] …

‘3. 1 and 2 are common knowledge between us’

(Bratman 1993: View 4)

Recall Bratman's sufficient conditions for shared intention'

The same objection applies here: the case of Beatrice and Baldric shows that you can meet the conditions Bratman imposes without any contralateral commitments.

What does gilbert say in favour of this?

‘When people regard themselves as collectively intending to do something, they appear to understand that, by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone, each party has the standing to demand [...] conformity of the other parties. A joint commitment account of collective intention respects this fact. [...] accounts that do not appeal to joint commitment—such as those of Michael Bratman and John Searle—are hard-pressed to do so.’

\citep[pp.~88–9]{gilbert:2014_book}

Gilbert (2013, pp 88-9)

This is not an argument. Never do this in your essays. Either they can or they cannot. Also note that the subject is an account. A person might be hard pressed to do something; an account cannot be.

Stress ‘by virtue of the collective intention, and that alone’ in this quote.

Consider Bratman’s argument against this second premise ...

Bratman: ‘Shared intention, social explanation’

The gist of Bratman’s repsonse is this. Yes: Shared intentions are associated with contralateral commitments. But: the association can be explained by factors extraneous to shared agency.

Let’s see how this explanation goes ...

Note that what follows isn’t exactly what Bratman says; I’m borrowing his ideas to respond to what I think might be a good argument from commitment against the Simple View and, as we’ll see, against Bratman’s view.

If I assure you of something, or intentionally encourage you to rely on it, then you are in a special position to criticise me.

The association of shared intention with contralateral commitments is a consequence of the fact that shared intentions are often sustained by assurance and suchlike.

Specifically, the interdependence of persistence may depend on commitments or commitment generating things.

This would be a great essay topic: read Gilbert plus Roth (2004) on Scanlon plus Chapter 4 of Bratman’s book and try to work out who is right.

So if you accept Bratman’s view, do you think contralateral commitments are just irrelevant in giving an account of shared agency? Not at all because ..

Contralateral commitments sometimes enable us to have shared intentions.

How is contralateral commitment associated with shared intention?

Bratman: it’s extrinsic

Gilbert (and others): it’s intrinsic

Not all shared intention involves contralateral commitment.

All shared intention involves contralateral commitment.

The existence of contralateral commitments can be explained by general ethical and social facts.

The existence of contralateral commitments cannot be explained by general ethical and social facts.

Gilbert is explicit about what grounds her theorising.

‘informal observation including self-observation’ and my ‘own sense of the matter’.

(Gilbert, 2014 pp. 24, 358)

So it seems that the debate between Gilbert and Bratman cannot easily be resolved.

Let me explain what I think we should conclude.

Conclusion 1. Bratman is right at least insofar as it is not obvious whether an account of shared agency must explain the origin of contralateral commitments. So there is no good objection to his view here. (People sometimes claim that contralateral commitments are intrinsic to shared agency, but why accept this?)

Objection

1. The states specified by Bratman’s view are not associated with contralateral commitments.

2. An account of shared agency must explain the origin of contralateral commitments.

Therefore

3. Bratman’s view is at best incomplete.

Let me finish by putting this really crudely. Our current task is to explain what distinguishes joint action from parallel but merely individual action.

It seems we might be able to do this by invoking contralateral commitments. What are the prospects for this idea?

Joint Action

Parallel but Merely Individual Action

Two people making the cross hit the red square in the ordinary way.

Beatrice & Baldric’s making the cross hit the red square

Two sisters cycling together.

Two strangers cycling the same route side-by-side.

Members of a flash mob simultaneously open their newspapers noisily.

Onlookers simultaneously open their newspapers noisily.

Two caveats ...

Contralateral commitments are associated with shared intention, not joint action.

They are plausibly features related to intention; this is why I introduced them by analogy with individual intention.

This limits what we can hope to achieve by appeal to contralateral commitment. Not an account of joint action, but only of the form which involves shared intention. Still, given our progress so far even that much would be quite an achievement.

Shared intention does not require much commitment.

‘If they are walking together, both Andrea herself and Heinrich will have the understandings so far described: by virtue of their walking together Andrea has a right to Heinrich’s continued walking alongside her, together with the standing to issue related rebukes and demands.’

\citep[p.~25]{gilbert:2014_book}

Gilbert (2014, p. 25)

I think this is ridiculous (although lots do not; e.g. ‘We agree with Gilbert that joint action goes, intuitively, with the sort of joint commitment that she describes’ \citep[p.~32]{pettit:2006_joint}; also Helm endorses Gilbert).

‘Mightn’t one have a noncommittal attitude toward one’s walk with someone if, for example, one suspects that person might turn out to be irritable and unpleasant company?’

\citep[p.~361]{Roth:2004ki}

Roth (2004, p. 361)

I think Roth is roughly right. The same is true concerning ordinary, individual intention. Yes, intention, unlike mere desire, involves commitment to act; but that commitment can be extremely fragile.

So these are the caveats I think we should accept.

If we are going to make use of contralateral commitments, we should first spend some time trying to better understand what they are and how they might arise. This is my next topic ...

conclusion

In conclusion, ...

Intentions are somehow associated with commitments.
Shared intentions are somehow associated with contralateral commitments.
A Gilbert-esq objection to Bratman’s account fails.
But we have an independent reason for interest in commitment.

Keyboard Shortcuts?

Lecture 06

Joint Action

[email protected]

The Objection From Contralateral Commitment

Keyboard Shortcuts`?`