\title {Joint Action \\ Lecture 03}
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\def \isubtitle {Joint Action}
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Today’s lecture is about Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency, focussing on
what he says about shared intention.
I think it’s worth spending some time with Bratman’s account because
his is the leading, best developed account.
Although I do want to argue that he is wrong in some major respects about
shared intention, no one else has published a good objection to his acocunt.
You could say that he is currently the undefeated champion, at least for now.
And even if you end up agreeing with me that Bratman’s account is wrong, it
is almost certain that you will be influenced by his ideas in some way or another
when constructing an alternative account.
\section{Walking Together in the Tarantino Sense}
\section{Walking Together in the Tarantino Sense}
The Simple View, having survived the objection that it involves circularity
and Bratman’s ‘mafia’ objection,
now faces a yet more challenging objection.
Apparently the Simple View cannot distinguish between all the contrast cases
that an account of shared agency must distinguish.
(Contrast cases are pairs of cases where one involves shared agency
and the other does not and which are otherwise as similar as possible).
Recall Bratman’s ‘mafia’ objection
The Simple View
Two or more agents perform an intentional joint action
exactly when there is an act-type, φ, such that
each agent intends that
they, these agents, φ together
and their intentions are to their actions.
Bratman’s ‘mafia case’
Recall that
Michael Bratman offers a counterexample to something related to the Simple View.
Suppose that you and I each intend that we, you and I, go to New York together.
But your plan is to point a gun at me and bundle me into the boot (or trunk) of your
car.
Then you intend that we go to New York together, but in a way that doesn't
depend on my intentions. As you see things, I'm going to New York with you whether
I like it or not. This doesn't seem like the basis for shared agency.
After all, your plan involves me being abducted.
But it is still a case in which we each intend that we go to New York together and we do.
So, apparently, the conditions of the Simple View are met (or almost met) and yet there is
no shared agency.
1. I intend that we, you and I, go to NYC together.
2. You intend that we, you and I, go to NYC together.
3. You intend that we, you and I, go to NYC together by way of you forcing me into the back of my car.
Walking together
Here is my attempt to improve on Bratman’s counterexample.
Contrast friends walking together in the way friends ordinarily walk,
which is a paradigm example of joint action,
with two gangsters who walk together like this ...
... Gangster 1 pulls a gun on Gangster 2 and says: “let’s walk”
But Gangster 2 does the same thing to Gangster 1 simultaneously.
another contrast case: blocking the aisle
Imagine two sisters who, getting off an aeroplane, tacitly agree to exact revenge on
the unruly mob of drunken hens behind them by standing so as to block the aisle together.
This is a joint action.
Meanwhile on another flight, two strangers happen to be so configured that they are
collectively blocking the aisle.
The first passenger correctly anticipates that the other passenger, who is a
complete stranger, will not be moving from her current position for some time.
This creates an opportunity for the first passenger: she intends that they,
she and the stranger, block the aisle.
And, as it happens, the second passenger’s thoughts mirror the first’s.
Recall our earlier contrast cases ...
***BRATMAN's DIAGNOSIS - have to intend to do it by way of the other’s intentions.
This is what is wrong in blocking the aisle
shared agency means connecting with each other as agents, not merely as bodies
Bratman’s brilliant idea for avoiding this sort of problem is to suggest that we don’t just each intend the action but rather we each intend to act by way of the other's intentions.
We can put this by saying that our intentions must interlock: mine specify yours and yours mind.
Now this appeal to interlocking intentions enables Bratman to avoid counterexamples like the Tarantino walkers; if I intend that we walk by way of your intention that we walk, I suppose can't rationally also point a gun at you and coerce you to walk.
‘each agent does not just intend that the group perform the […] joint action.
‘Rather, each agent intends as well that the group perform this joint action in accordance with subplans (of the intentions in favor of the joint action) that mesh’
(Bratman 1992: 332)
`each agent does not just intend that the group perform the […] joint action. Rather, each agent intends as well that the group perform this joint action in accordance with subplans (of the intentions in favor of the joint action) that mesh' \citep[p.\ 332]{Bratman:1992mi}.
Our plans are \emph{interconnected} just if facts about your plans feature in mine and conversely.
‘shared intentional [i.e.\ collective] agency consists, at bottom, in interconnected planning agency of the participants’ \citep{Bratman:2011fk}.
Shared Intention: A Placeholder
\section{Shared Intention: A Placeholder}
\section{Shared Intention: A Placeholder}
Most philosophers agree that a notion of shared intention is needed
to characterise shared agency. The idea is that shared intention
stands to joint action as ordinary, individual
intention stands to ordinary, individual action.
But what is shared intention?
Recall our question, What distinguishes joint actions from parallel but merely individual actions?
‘A first step is to say that what distinguishes you and me from you and the Stranger is that you and
I share an intention to walk together—we (you and I) intend to walk together—but you and the Stranger
do not. In modest sociality, joint activity is explained by such a shared intention; whereas no such
explanation is available for the combined activity of you and the Stranger. This does not, however,
get us very far; for we do not yet know what a shared intention is, and how it connects up with joint
action’ \citep[p.~152]{Bratman:2009lv}.
‘A first step is to say that what distinguishes’ the sisters cycling together from the strangers cycling side by side is that the sisters to cycle together ... but the strangers do not.
Bratman, 2009 p. 152
Parallel with individual action ...
It is helpful to draw a parallel with individual action ...
Consider Davidson’s question
‘What events in the life of a person reveal agency; what are his deeds and his doings in contrast to mere happenings in history; what is the mark that distinguishes his actions?’
Davidson (1971, p. 43)
\citep[p.~43]{Davidson:1971fz}
It is perhaps helpful to think of this question by contrasing actions with
things that merely happen to an agent.
To illustrate, we might be struck by the contrast between your arm being caused to go
up by forces beyond your control, and the action you perform when you raise your arm.
Or we might be struck by the contrast between mere reflexes, such as the eyeblink reflex,
and the action of blinking your eyes (perhaps to greet someone).
‘Echoing Wittgenstein's question about the difference, in the individual case,
between my arm's rising and my raising it, we can ask: what is the difference
between such a contrast case and corresponding shared intentional activity?
In the case of individual intentional human action, we can see the difference from
a contrast case as involving an explanatory role of relevant intentions of the
individual agent. ... I propose an analogous view ofthe shared case: the difference
in the case of shared agency involves an appropriate explanatory role of relevant
shared intentions. Our painting together is a shared intentional activity,
roughly, when we paint together because we share an intention so to act.’
\citep[p.~10]{bratman:2014_book}
In short, Davidson’s question is, Which events are actions?
Suppose we ask, Which events are actions?
(This is Davidson’s question.)
Here the contrast is with things that merely happen to an agent.
To illustrate, we might be struck by the contrast between your arm being caused to go
up by forces beyond your control, and the action you perform when you raise your arm.
Or we might be struck by the contrast between mere reflexes, such as the eyeblink reflex,
and the action of blinking your eyes (perhaps to greet someone).
One quite natural and certainly influential way to answer this question is by
appeal to intention. The idea is that events are actions in virtue of being
appropriately related to an intention of yours.
Note that I’m not confidently endorsing this answer; in fact I’m not even
confident that the question is ultimately the right question to ask.
I’m just suggesting this is a reasonably straightforward starting point for us.
This question about ordinary, individual action is parallel to our current working
question about joint action, which we might phrase as ‘Which events are *joint* actions’ ...
Now we can see one attraction of appealing to shared intention.
It allows us to give a parallel answer to the question about joint action:
a joint action is an event which is appropriately related to a shared intention.
So to the extent that we are persuaded by the standard account of which events are actions,
it is natural to aim for a structurally parallel account of which events are joint actions.
To do this we merely have to characterise shared intentions.
As we shall see, there are long running, deep conflicts over the nature of shared
intention. The range of different approaches can be quite daunting.
This parallel between intention and shared intention is important because it is
a rare point on wihch almost everyone will agree.
\textbf{Despite the disagreement on details, I think one thing almost everyone agrees about
is this: shared intention is to joint action at least approximately what
ordinary individual intention is to ordinary, individual action.}
It’s important to acknowledge that we haven’t yet said anything very informative
about what shared intention is.
The question was, Which events are joint actions?
The answer was, those which stand in an appropriate relation to a shared intention.
Then we ask what a shared intention is.
And the answer is, it’s something in virtue of which events are joint actions.
I don’t think the circle makes this completely useless;
but I’m mentioning the circularity to stress that we don’t yet have an account
of what shared intention is.
An account of shared intention should to provide deep insight
into the nature of shared agency.
\section{Why Not Take ‘Shared Intention’ Literally?}
\section{Why Not Take ‘Shared Intention’ Literally?}
On most accounts, shared intentions are neither shared nor intentions.
But why not take the term literally?
Intentions can be shared in the sense in which Ayesha and her best friend share a name.
(This would yield a version of the Simple View.)
Or perhaps they can be shared in the sense in which Ayesha and her brother share a mother.
To understand the plural subject account, consider the formal features of mental states.
Here is a desire ...
The desire has three parts, subject, attitude and content.
The subject is you or me or whoever.
(The subject might not be the agent but some part of it.
That is, we can imagine that some component of an agent, like her perceptual system or
motor system, represents things that she herself does not.)
The attitude is labelled ‘belief’ or whatever.
These are usually distinguishes by their causal, explanatory and normative roles.
Roughly, what makes a *belief* that Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill different
from a *desire* that Ayesha will cycle up Hármashatár hill is that these two things
will have different effects on the subject’s actions.
The content is what distinguishes one belief from all others, or one desire from all others.
The content is also what determines whether a belief is true or false, and whether a
desire is satisfied or unsatisfied.
There are two main tasks in constructing a theory of mental states.
The first task is to characterise the different attitudes.
This typically involves specifying their distinctive functional and normative roles.
The second task is to find a scheme for specifying the contents of mental states.
The second task is to find a scheme for specifying the contents of mental states.
Usually this is done with propositions (and we don’t need to worry about that here).
Most philosophers think that shared intention is special with respect to at least
one of subject, attitude and content. However they disagree on which, and how.
Corresponding to each of the three things--subject, attitude and content--there are
different strategies for trying to explain shared intention.
Strategies for explaining shared intention:
\begin{enumerate}
\item mess with the subject \citep[e.g.][]{helm_plural_2008,Schmid:2008,schmid:2009_plural_bk,pettit:2006_joint}
\item mess with the attitude \citep[e.g.][]{Searle:1990em,gallotti:2013_social}
\item mess with the content \citep[e.g.][]{Bratman:1993je,bratman:2014_book}
\item mess with all three \citep[e.g][]{gilbert:2014_book}
\end{enumerate}
So one strategy for explaining shared intention is to try messing with the subject.
I think this is potentially interesting, whether or not it gives us shared intention.
conclusion
In conclusion, ...